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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH SUDAN
Past attempts at security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobi-
lization, and reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan have made no significant 
contribution to ‘right-sizing’ the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and 
were unable to sustainably change South Sudan’s security apparatus. Taking 
into account lessons learned from previous DDR and SSR attempts, this Working 
Paper provides hints as to what the key aspects are that need to be re-considered 
to improve on security sector transformation in South Sudan. The authors  
argue that DDR and SSR, if not reinvented and reconsidered in a more radical 
way, are very unlikely to lead to significant change. The government of South 
Sudan (GoSS), and the SPLA and SPLA In Opposition (SPLA-IO) in particular, 
continue to function as highly centralized patronage systems. The country’s 
military is used as a tool to secure the position of key individuals, advance the 
interest of particular ethnic groups, and to bring wealth and status to their 
members. Without breaking these patronage networks and addressing the power 
nodes, any attempt at security sector transformation will be bound to fail.  
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military and political opponents, in essence offering 
integration into the security sector (with its access to 
social status and material benefits) in exchange for 
political acquiescence. While this policy bought the 
country a modicum of peace and political stability in 
the inter-war period (2005–2013), it came at a high 
price as the continuing divisions between the different 
elements of the security sector significantly contrib-
uted to the outbreak of civil war following the political 
crisis of December 2013.
 
DDR and SSR efforts need to have clear 
goals, be based on a realistic assessment 
of the situation and connected to wider 
political processes in the country 
The example of South Sudan shows that different 
donors have different and sometimes contradictory 
goals in their programming. For example, a radical 
reduction of the size of the security sector, while ben-
eficial in the long-term, would have increased political 
tensions and potentially violent conflict in the near 
future. Some international partners (as well as the 
Juba government itself) were also interested in build-
ing South Sudan’s military strength as a deterrent to 
a perceived threat from North Sudan. A fundamental 
reform of the security sector would have—at least 
temporarily—weakened the SPLA’s ability to operate 
effectively on the battlefield. In this situation, the  
international community decided to support different 
piece-meal approaches to DDR and SSR, such as rein-
tegration programmes for the so-called special needs 
groups as well as capacity-building efforts for the  
security sector. In doing so, the country’s international 
partners assumed that there was genuine political 
will among the ruling elite to change the precarious 
status quo. Failing to understand (or choosing to  
ignore) the inherently political nature of the problem, 
the international community offered only technical 
solutions to security sector reform, which were not 
connected to broader political processes, thereby  
perpetuating the situation. 
Main Findings
A window of opportunity to reform the 
security sector in South Sudan was 
missed following the signing of the CPA 
The success of DDR and SSR efforts depends to a large 
extent on timing—in the case of South Sudan, a his-
toric window of opportunity to address this challenge 
existed in the first two years after the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  
Following three decades of civil war between different 
Southern groups, as well as with the government in 
Khartoum, the population welcomed the presence of 
international forces and the prospect of peace and 
development. At the same time, the international 
community had considerable leverage with the newly 
formed government in Juba, as the latter depended on 
its political backing in the negotiation with Khartoum. 
While the provisions of the CPA with regard to DDR 
and SSR were somewhat unclear, they could have 
served as a road map for a more fundamental trans-
formation of security arrangements in the country 
had the UN and its international partners acted more 
quickly and decisively. 
South Sudan’s security sector is a crucial 
element of the government’s patronage 
network 
Both the SPLA (as well as the different paramilitary 
forces, such as the police, the wildlife and the prison 
services) and the SPLA-IO (in opposition) remain an 
agglomeration of different ethnic factions, often ter-
ritorial in nature and personally loyal to their com-
manding officers. The distinction between professional 
soldiers (uniformed and paid by the government) and 
local self-defence groups remains blurry as SPLA (and 
police units) often engage in inter-communal conflict 
over access to natural resources (water, grazing land 
and cattle). Following the failure of the UN to demo-
bilize the different militias in South Sudan in line 
with the provision of the CPA of 2005, the government 
in Juba adopted the so-called Big Tent policy vis-à-vis 
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agreement into effect has lagged behind the envi-
sioned schedule). It took the international communi-
ty very long to exert meaningful pressure on the two 
sides to execute crucial elements of the deal, which 
resulted in tremendous delays particularly around 
enforcing the security arrangements—delays that are 
unfortunately all too familiar from the CPA period. 
The peace deal and the subsequent security workshop 
also did not provide sufficient clarity regarding the 
cantonment and demobilization process (e.g. the 
number and location of cantonment sites, but also 
the eligibility of certain IO forces to go into canton-
ment). These unresolved elements not only slowed 
down the deal’s implementation but at the same time 
also played into the hands of hardliners on the SPLA 
and SPLA-IO side. To end the current state of sus-
pense, one needs to get the national architecture en-
visioned by the peace deal functional as quickly as 
possible to finally promote thorough and drastic re-
form of the security sector that the country is in dire 
need of. 
Alternatives to the traditional DDR 
and SSR approach in South Sudan exist, 
but they would be costly both politically 
and materially
It has often been said, that there are no alterna-
tives to the path chosen by the international commu-
nity in dealing with the political leadership of South 
Sudan when it comes to reforming the security sector. 
While this is, without doubt, the most sensitive policy 
sector in the country and donors, who are accustomed 
to getting their way (in exchange for a significant  
resource commitment) in other sectors, such as 
health or agriculture, are not used to the amount of 
push-back and double-play from the South Sudanese 
elite, have in the past preferred to stay away from  
security-related matters. At the same time, reform in 
this sector is an obvious precondition for any sustain-
able peace settlement. It is therefore worthwhile to 
look the at the experience of countries such as Libe-
ria, where radical reforms of the security sector took 
place against the stated wishes of wartime military 
leaders. Such reforms are possible, but they depend on 
the willingness of the international community to 
effectively guarantee the security of the people of 
South Sudan through an international peacekeeping 
force (something the UN has not been able to do since 
2005), effectively creating an international protectorate.  
The current peace deal is bound to 
make similar mistakes as they were 
made during the CPA period
The international community largely imposed on 
the warring parties the August 2015 peace deal, which 
is a power-sharing agreement like the CPA. Even prior 
to the most recent eruption of violence in July 2016, 
the SPLA and SPLA-IO have shown very little trust in 
the process. While the CPA was criticized for doing 
too little too late in terms of security sector reform, 
the implementation of the provisions of this peace 
deal has so far been equally slow (for instance, the 
creation of the national architecture to put the 
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understand that their support helps maintain the 
current practice of using the SPLA and SPLA-IO to 
form and maintain political patronage networks. This 
needs to be abolished if security sector transformation 
efforts are to succeed. Donor support over the years 
has come to supplant social services, freeing up addi-
tional resources for the security sector in the process. 
Support of social services cannot continue unabated 
while government budgets for the security sector go 
up. Downsizing activities (whatever form these 
might take in future) should not be regarded as a  
social benefit programme to serve the interests of 
certain commanders and small groups of people but 
as a tool of building a sustainable security apparatus. 
Introducing biometric registration is a first step.
International assistance to South 
Sudan’s security sector should involve 
more conditionality and focus on  
enhancing accountability mechanisms 
‘Train and equip’ programmes should only be 
supported if they are closely tied to accountability 
measures. Priority ought to be given to enhancing 
military justice. Donors should also introduce condi-
tionalities within projects, whereby receiving the 
next tranche of financial support is dependent on 
first achieving certain concrete results. For example: 
Submission of biometric data is a precondition for 
candidates being accepted. Coordination is crucial: 
Different donors can support different aspects of the 
professionalization drive, but political objectives need 
to be aligned in order to avoid being played out 
against one another.
Interventions targeting South Sudan’s 
security sector ought to take the  
current state of the SPLA and SPLA-IO 
as a baseline to work with 
Interventions should not aim at an ideal type 
military apparatus. Instead, policy planners should 
work primarily from what is possible and feasible and 
combine that with realistic estimates for what 
Policy recommendations
Reconstitute the security sector and 
then abolish the practice of buying 
short-term peace by integrating militias 
into the army 
Given the current divisions in the country, which 
largely followed infighting and divisions inside the 
SPLA and the political system, the South Sudanese  
security sector will in reality need to be built up from 
scratch. This will include proportional representation 
on the basis of ethnicity and a dismissal of generals 
found responsible for gross human rights violations. 
Once that has been achieved, ensure that rules and 
regulations for promotions within the military are in 
place and adhered to (these should be based on mili-
tary success, loyalty, and education). Consider having 
generals’ appointments being approved by parliament. 
Moreover, militia integration should in principle be 
banned. One should avoid by all means making simi-
lar mistakes like in the past, opting for an open-ended 
integration process and integrate again all types of 
armed actors into the national armed forces. Unfor-
tunately, Kiir’s most recent incorporation of friendly 
militias into the army in 2015 indicates that this kind 
of policy is still the SPLA’s fallback option for dealing 
with unrest. However, in light of the economic col-
lapse, the sinking oil prices, and lack of international 
donor support, even as a short-term strategy South 
Sudan can simply not afford ‘buying peace’ in such a 
manner. 
Treat the security sector as part of a 
broader political challenge facing the 
country 
Donors should see their engagement with South 
Sudan as a complete package, whereby SSR and DDR 
cannot be technical interventions separate from 
broader political processes. Setbacks in one area (civil 
society harassment, financial transparency) should 
have repercussions for support to the security services 
(training and equipment, invitations to international 
courses and seminars). Donors should also 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH SUDAN 
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inflation while SPLA benefits should remain flat. Con-
sider more flexible forms of policing based around  
local security arrangements. This, combined with  
increasing movements of SPLA units around the 
country, will make it more interesting for youth to  
either engage with, or become part of SSNPS instead 
of SPLA. Furthermore, military commanders engaging 
in law enforcement operations should be formally 
answerable to civilian authorities and the police.  
Civilian disarmament (e.g. in form of a weapons 
linked to development approach) may only start once 
the SSNPS is able to guarantee a modicum of security 
in the rural areas to be targeted for disarmament.
Implement youth-at-risk programmes 
and other employment schemes in 
regions with a high concentration of 
mobilized youth and adults 
The current crisis has revealed the fragility and 
division of the country and has shown how easy it is 
for individuals to mobilize and incite large numbers 
of people. Reports from various regions in South Sudan 
indicate that youth groups like the White Army gath-
ered to engage in the conflict. This quick mobilization 
of (youth) groups was possible partly because many of 
them have been excluded from the benefits of the 
country’s independence. In the framework youth-at-
risk projects, young people should be targeted espe-
cially in those regions with a high concentration of 
mobilized youth. To ensure a peace dividend, quick 
impact employment schemes such as labour intensive 
projects or public works programmes (separate from 
the military) at grassroots level ought to be initiated. 
Ideally, these would aim at youth as well as adults.
institutions can achieve within the South Sudanese 
context. It is obvious that neither the SPLA nor the 
SPLA-IO have a profound interest in downsizing their 
forces. In light of this challenge, it is essential to com-
promise on a way forward and taking note of the  
incentives of the parties to retain or reduce their forces. 
In addition, observers and practitioners, including 
donors, should not shy away from examining individual 
and group relations inside the security services and 
between the political and military realm in order to 
understand the impact of their interventions. 
Membership of political parties must 
be outlawed for the SPLA and SPLA-IO 
The political and military sphere in the Republic 
of South Sudan is still very much inter-connected. 
The only sustainable way to promote a demilitarization 
of the South Sudanese society and to break political 
patronage is to disconnect the security services from 
the SPLM. An army that serves the unity of the coun-
try and defends each and every South Sudanese ought 
to be apolitical. Therefore, members of the organized 
forces should not be allowed to be a member of any 
political party. The usage of military titles for civilians 
should be prohibited.
To increase community security and 
protection, the role of the SSNPS needs 
to be strengthened vis-à-vis the SPLA 
and the SPLA-IO 
SSNPS’s ability to protect the life and property of 
the citizens remains limited due to limited capacity, 
training, infrastructure, equipment and funds. Above 
all, the military in the past has assumed tasks and  
responsibilities that should in fact be assigned to the 
police. What is needed in future is a gradual with-
drawal of the military from the sectors that have to 
be managed by SSNPS. Concurrently, SSNPS’ role and 
image ought to be promoted to build trust between 
the police and the population. Benefits for SSNPS 
should be indexed against (a reasonable rate of) 
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This is as far as the theory goes; the reality looks 
quite different: Not even a year after its adoption, the 
peace deal is on the brink of collapse. The renewed 
outbreak of violence in Juba in July 2016, which left 
several hundred people dead and triggered a new 
wave of internal and external displacement, exempli-
fies the weaknesses of the peace process and calls 
into question both the seriousness and the ability of 
the conflict parties to bring and to maintain peace. 
Both sides make no secret of their lack of confidence 
in the deal, which they say is mainly a result of  
intense international pressure. In the months leading 
up to the most recent outbreak of violence, the parties 
have, where possible, delayed the implementation of 
the permanent ceasefire and transitional security  
arrangements (PCTSA). The TGoNU, for instance, was 
only formed after significant time lags, in April 2016, 
after Machar’s return to Juba. Despite calls of the  
international community on the rival forces to  
demilitarize the capital and limit the number of gov-
ernment troops in the city, the demilitarization process 
has been incomplete, and international monitors 
were not given the chance to verify the process. Efforts 
to establish a joint integrated police command in 
Juba were only pursued half-heartedly and far from 
ready by the time the TGoNU was formed (author  
interviews conducted in Juba in June 2016).
These delays in implementing the security  
arrangements came along with never-ending dis-
putes over the number and location of cantonment 
sides, particularly in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal and 
Equatoria regions. 1 In the past months, this has hin-
dered the separation of forces and has stalled any 
constructive dialogue on the national security  
arrangements (author interviews conducted in Juba 
in June 2016). While the preparations for a canton-
ment process were underway, fighting intensified in 
most major towns of Western Equatoria (Yambio, 
Mundri, Maridi) and Western Bahr el Ghazal (Raja, 
 
 
1 \  The government under the leadership of President Kiir has been de-
nying the presence of SPLA-IO forces in Greater Equatoria and Greater 
Bahr el Ghazal and has hence objected to an establishment of canton-
ment sites in these areas. 
Introduction
In December 2013, following political tensions  
between South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir and 
members of an opposition faction of his own political 
party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movemement 
(SPLM), armed conflict erupted between Nuer and 
Dinka elements of the presidential guard in the capital 
Juba. Kiir was quick to announce that his former Vice 
President Riek Machar, a member of the Nuer ethnic 
group, was behind the clashes and had attempted a 
coup against the President—an allegation Machar  
denied. The conflict quickly escalated, spreading into 
Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States. With entire  
divisions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA) defecting and splitting their allegiances mostly 
along ethnic lines between the government and 
Machar’s camp (known as SPLA in Opposition,  
SPLA-IO), the army quickly fell apart. Although the 
warring parties signed a number of ceasefire agree-
ments, starting in January 2014, these were largely  
ignored, and the conflict continued relentlessly. All 
over South Sudan, various other armed groups joined 
the fighting, turning the conflict into a fully fledged 
civil war fought on the ground largely along ethnic 
lines, which has since its start in December 2013 
killed at least tens of thousands of people and left 
over two million people internally displaced (OCHA, 
2016; Bohnet, forthcoming). 
Under the threat of international sanctions, and 
following several rounds of negotiations supported by 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), President Salva Kiir and SPLA-IO leader 
Machar signed a peace deal in Addis Ababa on  
17 August 2015. This deal offers the SPLA-IO the post of 
the first Vice-President and stipulates the formation 
of a Transitional Government of National Unity 
(TGoNU) to govern for a period of 30 months at the 
end of which elections are to be held. It moreover  
requires all military forces to leave the capital Juba, 
to be replaced by a Joint Integrated Police. A Commis-
sion for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing is to inves-
tigate human rights violations, and a hybrid court is 
to be established to try those responsible for human 
rights abuses and war crimes during the recent civil 
war (IGAD, 2015). 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH SUDAN 
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 armed groups continued to destabilize the country 
and dispute such a monopoly. Threatened by various 
armed actors inside the country who could potentially 
derail the independence referendum stipulated in the 
CPA, the SPLA chose to integrate these militias into 
its ranks. This policy clashed with broader security 
sector reform initiatives in the post-CPA period, 
which aimed at downsizing the military and trans-
forming the SPLA into an accountable and affordable 
force. SSR and disarmament, demobilization and rein-
tegration (DDR) programmes overlooked, or rather  
ignored, this dilemma in which the South Sudanese 
military found itself: Security sector reform in the 
sense of a centralized, top-down imposition of force 
structure was a very difficult and—from a South  
Sudanese military perspective—even dangerous 
thing to do in an environment under continuous 
threat of destabilization and contestation. 
The previous point, however, only partly explains 
the reluctance of the SPLA to seriously commit to  
institutional reform of the army. Changing the status 
quo and promoting a broader security sector transfor-
mation process meant interfering with the very  
lucrative personal patronage networks run by senior 
military commanders and triggered internal resistance 
from potential losers. 
Given this lack of political will to promote SSR, 
the security apparatus in South Sudan has not funda-
mentally changed over the past decade. Despite their 
formal hierarchies and command and control struc-
tures, the SPLA and SPLA-IO remain an aggregation 
of clientele networks in which recruitment, and com-
mand and control works largely along ethnic lines. 
The recent conflict has well exemplified how fragile 
the political accommodation is upon which these 
networks rest. Once the flows of money, positions and 
weapons dry up, and they break down, they form the 
principal threat to peace and security in the country.
While any attempt to promote transformation of 
South Sudan’s army and other organized forces is 
without any doubt a challenging endeavour, restruc-
turing the army so that its primary purpose becomes 
protecting its citizens, is arguably the key to 
and Wau), which previously had been largely untouched 
by the fighting. This might be an indication that local 
armed opposition groups are affiliating with the  
SPLA-IO in an attempt to gain access to the cantonment 
process with its promise of material benefits and pos-
sible integration into a future national army.
At the time of writing, it is hard to see when and 
how the rival parties can overcome their disagree-
ments and start rebuilding the country and its security 
sector. The fact that Machar fled Juba after the intense 
fighting and was, in his absence, replaced by Taban 
Deng Gai, the former Minister of Mining, is a sign of 
serious divisions within the opposition.2 The United 
Nations regard the nomination of Gai as a violation to 
the peace deal (UNSG, 2016). This brings another com-
plicating layer to the already seemingly irresolvable 
conflict in South Sudan. It also perfectly illustrates 
that the recent civil war, despite having taken an ethnic 
dimension, is at least as much driven by a power 
struggle between influential military and political 
power-brokers. 
The SPLA has always been a tool and the major 
prize in this struggle for power and influence. So far, 
the country’s military has functioned to secure the 
position of key individuals, advance the interest of 
particular ethnic groups and to bring wealth and sta-
tus to their members. These patronage systems and 
the use or the threat of violence as a bargaining tool 
are at the heart of South Sudanese politics. The preva-
lence of clientele networks and the persisting ethnic 
divisions in the armed forces point to the failures of 
the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and 
security sector reform (SSR) initiatives to reconstitute 
the SPLA as a national army and guardian of the 
population. 
Although the CPA, by not recognizing any other 
armed force in Sudan outside the Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF) and the SPLA, aimed at establishing the SPLA’s 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force, other 
 
2 \  Gai, who was dismissed from the party membership by Machar a few 
days before being sworn in as new first Vice President, has been accused 
of defecting to Kiir’s faction.
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promoting lasting peace in the world’s youngest nation. 
The main question is how to ‘do it right this time’ 
and not to fall into the same traps as previous SSR 
and DDR attempts. The objective of this Working Paper 
is to demonstrate how past experiences can teach the 
international community what the key aspects are 
that need to be re-considered to improve on security 
sector reform in South Sudan. 
To overcome the deep-rooted defects of South  
Sudan’s security apparatus, it is essential to under-
stand the SPLA history and internal logic as well as 
the context it operates in. Against this background, 
the present Working Paper outlines the SPLA’s devel-
opment from rebel militias to a national force in 
Chapter 2. Based on this historical overview, the  
authors then provide a brief and critical analysis of 
previous DDR and SSR programmes and approaches 
(Chapter 3) and identify key issues to be taken into 
consideration in the implementation of the recent 
peace deal (Chapter 4) and long-term security sector 
transformation in South Sudan (Chapter 5).
The authors argue that past SSR and DDR efforts 
had a very limited impact as they did not systematic-
ally attempt to break down the control of predatory 
military elites over their patronage networks. What is 
needed in future is a different approach to addressing 
the problems of South Sudan’s security sector. The 
first step that needs to be taken in this respect is to 
put into question the standard security sector reform 
templates that were implemented in South Sudan in 
the past. The international community in particular 
will need to focus on how to break the existing  
patronage networks as they have been the major 
stumbling block in transforming South Sudan’s secu-
rity apparatus. Without addressing the power nodes 
of these networks, any security sector transformation 
attempt will be hamstrung. 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH SUDAN 
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In 1992, two prominent Nuer politicians, Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol, broke away from the move-
ment, criticizing its iconic leader, John Garang de 
Mabior, for leading in an increasingly authoritarian 
fashion. Machar and Akol formed the SPLA–Nasir, 
named after the town in Upper Nile State where they 
were based. The Nuer White Army youth militia, com-
manded by the SPLA–Nasir, was subsequently respon-
sible for a massacre that took place in 1991 in Bor, at 
that time part of Upper Nile State and nowadays the 
capital of Jonglei State. An estimated 2,000 people 
were killed, mostly Dinka civilians; these atrocities 
had serious repercussions on inter-ethnic relations 
between the Dinka and Nuer (Jok/Hutchinson, 1999). 
Over the course of the years, numerous Southern 
militia and local defence movements emerged, largely 
based around ethnicity, which for various reasons  
resisted the SPLA or would fight for local interests 
that could at times conflict with the broader political 
Evolution of the Sudan People’s  
Liberation Army
Fusion and fission (1982–2006) 
The peace deal signed in Addis Ababa on 17 August 
2015 follows a long tradition of power sharing agree-
ments between the various Southern Sudanese factions 
that form the ruling SPLM and it armed wing, the 
SPLA. After its inception in 1982, the SPLM managed 
to expand its support base amongst various ethnic 
groups both on the territory of today’s South Sudan 
and beyond. 3 Operating from bases in Ethiopia and 
later in Southern Sudan, the SPLA was able to militar-
ily challenge the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in  
numerous parts of the country. 
Map 1: South Sudan
3 \  As a matter of fact, the SPLM/A’s founder and long-term leader John 
Garang had envisioned a liberation movement appealing to marginal-
ized people across Sudan, including among the Arabic-speaking popu-
lation beyond the borders to today’s South Sudan. As a result of shared 
grievances, a number of armed groups in the Nuba Mountains, as well 
as in Darfur and in the Red Sea region of Sudan chose to join forces 
with the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A (North) with its power base in the Nuba 
Mountains and in Blue Nile State continue to wage a separate civil war 
against the government of Khartoum, which was re-kindled after the 
end of the CPA period and the independence of South Sudan in 2011.
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Despite its thirty different militias officially 
swearing allegiance to Machar, the SSDF never 
showed the internal coherence required to realize its 
full military potential. One of its most powerful com-
manders, Paulino Matip, found himself frequently at 
odds with Machar’s leadership, up to the point where 
his forces raided Machar’s home town of Leer. Other 
militias, such as the Equatoria Defence Forces (EDF) 
and those under the command of Gordon Kong,  
Klement Wani, Ismael Konye and Gabriel Tang-Ginye, 
were also only nominally taking orders  from Machar. 
The majority of militias came from the Greater Upper 
Nile region, which nowadays consists of Upper Nile 
State, Jonglei, and Unity State.
Notwithstanding their internal differences and 
weaknesses, the various components of the SSDF did 
constitute a considerable fighting force, able to match 
the SPLA on the battlefield. SSDF forces controlled the 
strategic oil fields of Unity State (and were responsible 
for driving much of the local population away) and 
provided security to SAF-controlled garrison towns in 
the South. The SPLA’s lack of military superiority, 
combined with the lack of roads and subsequent in-
accessibility of large parts of Southern Sudan, meant 
that a purely military solution to the conflict, both 
between the SPLA and SAF and between the different 
Southern factions, was always out of the question.  
Garang understood this and knew he had little choice 
but to try and unite different Southern opposition 
forces if the SPLA was to stand a chance against the 
NCP regime. After behind-the-scenes negotiations, 
Machar re-joined the SPLA in 2002 and was given a 
senior command position. Lam Akol, who himself 
had split off from the Machar earlier, followed suit 
one year later (Young, 2006).
The SPLA during the CPA period 
(2005–2011)
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
between the SPLA and the NCP government in Khar-
toum marked the start of the interim period that 
would lead up to the referendum on South Sudan’s 
objectives of the SPLA.4 The government in Khartoum, 
grappling with limited control over areas where its 
footprint was historically limited and infrastructure 
almost non-existent, decided to back some of these 
local groups to fight the SPLA as proxy forces. Its own 
armed forces focused on holding garrison towns 
(such as Juba, Malakal and Wau), and the rural areas 
were left to the local militias, which to different extents 
received logistical support from Khartoum. These 
groups were never able or willing to form a united 
front against the SPLA, until in 1996 the government 
of Sudan initiated the Khartoum Peace Agreement 
with various rebel movements, leading to (nominal) 
integration of the different Khartoum-aligned militias 
into the newly-formed South Sudan Defence Forces 
(SSDF). Riek Machar became the movement’s leader. 
Under the terms of the Agreement, the ‘head-
quarters’ of the different militias were relocated to 
Khartoum under the SSDF umbrella. Although the 
different constituent parts of the SSDF relied on the 
ruling National Congress Party (NCP) for weapons 
and ammunition, their allegiance was not with 
Khartoum and its Sharia-inspired leadership. Khar-
toum was neither able to fully unite the different fac-
tions, nor did it even want to. A strong, centrally led 
SSDF could potentially pose an alternative threat to 
the NCP regime, which had adopted a ‘divide and 
rule’ approach to conflicts on the periphery of Sudan. 
In fact, one of the reasons Machar and Akol fell out 
with Garang was that they did not share his vision of 
a united, secular, and democratic Sudan, instead opting 
for self-determination and future independence of 
Southern Sudan as their rallying cry. 
 
 
 
4 \  To many militia leaders, fighting was not about the broader political 
conflict, or even about the clash between the SSDF and the SPLA, as 
their main constituency was their own clan or tribe, with their young 
male members the main source of new militia recruits. Many of the 
youth would share time between joint operations with the militias 
and cattle keeping or cattle raiding—another form of interethnic con-
flict that had only limited links to the broader political conflict (Leff, 
2009). The Nuer White Army was and is a prime example of this shar-
ing of objectives, with their participation in Riek’s ventures usually of 
limited duration and based on a temporary convergence of interests 
with the SPLA-IO (Young, 2016, p. 12).
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between the number of officers, non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) and enlisted men was lost to the  
extent that South Sudan’s army reportedly boasted, 
apart from one hundred major-generals ‘uncountable 
brigadier-generals’. 6 the SPLA general headquarters 
and units were filled with high-ranking officers, often 
without the corresponding troops numbers but  
including the commensurate salaries and other 
privileges.7
Despite their formal integration, the different 
factions within the SPLA remained just that— 
factions. Ethnic integration and mixing of units did 
take place to a certain extent, and there were attempts 
to relocate former militia leaders to parts of the coun-
try other than those where they would come from, 
but to little avail. Soldiers would show limited respect 
for central command as they continued to take orders 
given by their own leaders, who were also the ones 
paying out their salaries. Because the majority of  
integrated militias originated in the Greater Upper 
Nile area, this meant that particular ethnic groups, 
especially the Nuer, were overrepresented in the army. 
Given the dominance of Dinka, the traditional core 
constituency of the SPLM/A, in other government  
positions this meant that smaller ethnic groups, par-
ticularly those from the Equatoria region were clearly 
underrepresented in powerful positions, leading to 
grievances persisting until the present day.
When Liberia’s new national army was formed in later years, none of 
the former combatants were allowed to join, which resulted in the fact 
that effectively a new military force was created from scratch, untainted 
by the patronage networks of the past. This clean break with the past 
undoubtedly contributed to the relatively stable political development 
of the West African nation in the past two decades. But this successful 
policy came with high political (essentially turning Liberia into an UN 
protectorate) and financial (a large peacekeeping mission) costs. In 
South Sudan, the international community has not been willing to pay 
such a high price
6 \  According to former SPLA Chief of General Staff James Hoth Mai in 
testimony to the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (CoI)  
(Africa Confidential, 2015). The final version of the CoI report had Hoth 
Mai‘s name redacted from the piece.The number of generals has fur-
ther risen since the statement was made, following numerous  
promotions by both the SPLA and the SPLA-IO.
7 \  In addition to fairly high salaries (by regional standards), senior officers 
in the SPLA enjoy free housing, unlimited access to government  
vehicles as well as educational and health care benefits for themselves 
and their families.
future. At the time, it was far from certain that Khar-
toum would actually allow the referendum to take 
place, let alone that it would allow the South to secede. 
A few weeks after the signing of the CPA, John Garang 
died in a helicopter crash. His deputy Salva Kiir  
Mayardit took over his positions as the leader of the 
SPLA, as President of Southern Sudan and as First 
Vice-President of Sudan. Rick Machar became the 
Vice President of the government of Southern Sudan 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
Co-Chair of the Joint Executive Political Committee.
The CPA mandated the establishment of joint in-
tegrated units (JIUs), which were to be composed of 
SPLA and SAF elements. These units were supposed to 
form the nucleus of the new, integrated security forces 
of the autonomous South Sudan. However, as it 
turned out, although the JIU would use a shared com-
mand structure and shared barracks, there was little 
interaction between the forces on the ground, and 
each side would take orders only from its own head-
quarters in Khartoum or Juba. During the CPA period, 
the played no role in the maintenance of law and  
order in South Sudan and remained largely confined 
to their barracks.
This situation was only compounded by the 2006 
Juba Declaration that led to the full integration of the 
remaining SSDF elements into the SPLA. Paulino 
Matip, the leader of the SSDF, was made Deputy Com-
mander in Chief of the SPLA, nominally second only 
to Salva Kiir. The role was outside of the formal hier-
archy structure of the SPLA though, and relations  
between Matip and Kiir were sometimes rocky,  
culminating in Matip accusing Kiir of trying to have 
him assassinated (Garang, 2009).
The Juba Declaration was part of Salva Kiir’s ‘Big 
Tent’ policy, meaning that instead of fighting the mi-
litias, Kiir opted for integrating them into the ranks 
of the SPLA, assigning their leaders various command 
posts and artificially inflated its payroll. In the end, 
this led to a bloated military structure.5 The balance 
5 \  It has often been stated that there were no alternatives to transforming 
the SPLA into South Sudan’s national army. This is not quite correct—
following the end of Liberia’s civil war in 1997, the UN demobilized 
more than 100,000 members of the different armed groups (Paes, 2005). 
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Tent policy was carried on targeting additional armed 
actors. After two more amnesties in the period from 
2005 to 2011, additional militia leaders were integrated, 
with some, such as Peter Gadet and David Yau Yau, 
defecting multiple times, only to be reintegrated later.9 
Reasons to walk away from the SPLA would generally 
include dissatisfaction with ethnic marginalization 
(David Yau Yau, Johnson Olony), election results 
(George Athor, again Yau Yau), lack of a political  
appointment (Gatluak Gai) or ranks offered in the 
SPLA (Gadet). 
These militia leaders were very successful at  
recruiting fighters among the members of their own 
ethnic group, the majority of whom joined voluntarily. 
The dire economic situation (high inflation, lack of 
employment opportunities) meant that integration 
into the SPLA became a highly attractive option for 
local youth who had joined the ranks of militias. It 
provided a relatively reliable government salary that 
was significantly above what an (usually) unschooled 
and illiterate young man could hope to earn in a gov-
ernment job. Disaffected youth also had little alterna-
tive, as in South Sudan there are very few private sec-
tor jobs. In addition, most militias would only operate 
in their home region, doubling as a local security 
provider.
This made the challenge for DDR programmes in 
the country so daunting. They were up against a system 
in which many youth had no education or formal 
skills, no work experience outside the militias, and in 
which youth traditionally have a very strong role as 
providers of protection to their communities, par-
ticularly those with combat experience. To offer  
incentives that would outweigh those factors would 
always be an enormous challenge. 
9 \  Many of the more prominent current commanders have a background 
as militia commanders integrated into the ‘regular’ forces of SPLA  
and IO, such as Shilluk General Johnson Olony and Bul Nuer General  
Matthew Pul Yang.
The integration of different militias into the SPLA 
had a ballooning effect on the number of soldiers and 
officers. Estimates vary considerably, but many claim 
the figures between 2005 and 2009 would have ranged 
roughly between 140,000 and 190,000 women and 
(mostly) men (Global Security, 2014). All commanders 
had an interest in misrepresenting these figures, as it 
would mean effectively being in command of a larger 
army and thus being entitled to higher ranks and 
more government salaries. Many of them therefore 
were ghost soldiers, i.e. people (often related to senior 
military leaders) receiving a salary without actually 
wearing a uniform or, in some cases, they even used 
purely fictitious names. A leaked US Cable from the 
Khartoum embassy in 2006 quotes a military contractor 
saying that the actual number of combat-ready forces 
at the time was in fact 45,395; 4,599 of them officers 
(Wikileaks, 2006). 
This means that the number of 180,000 men used 
as the basis of the initial DDR programme (see below) 
was never a realistic one. With a planned electronic 
pay-roll system never fully adopted and a lack of  
biometric data, there has never been an accurate 
 financial administration in the SPLA. Salaries are 
high compared to other public service jobs, and that 
difference further increased when in the run up to 
independence, President Kiir decided to almost double 
them. As a result, security sector expenditure sky-
rocketed. Military expenses already accounted for 
roughly 40 per cent of the government budget, but  
actual expenditure was likely much higher, reaching 
almost 60 per cent. Spending on the security sector is 
even larger and as a share of total government ex-
penditure has only increased. Although exact figures 
are not available, security spending at the time of 
writing should amount to over 80 per cent. 8 
Although the SPLA never was the force it was 
supposed to be on paper, it did grow following the 
Juba Declaration and continued to do so as the Big 
8 \  This is partially because the size of the national security service (NSS), 
and therefore expenditure, has increased dramatically since the out-
break of the civil war. Expenditure is difficult to monitor as it falls under 
the classified budget for the Office of the President (UN Panel of Experts, 
2016). NSS has, since its inception, largely been left out of any discussion 
related to SSR and DDR.
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new legislations and regulations, the underlying 
principles of which frequently clashed with existing 
cultures based on trust, oral communication and lim-
ited individual accountability. The new rules required 
changes in behaviour and structure beyond what 
could realistically be expected from civil servants 
who had only received limited tertiary or even  
secondary education and had not necessarily been 
appointed on the basis of merit.11  
The result was that many of the new bodies showed 
an outward appearance of a respectable institution 
with ministers, directors, stamps, seals, letterheads 
and an ever-increasing number of rules and internal 
procedures in place to guide the institution in a fair, 
accountable and transparent manner. However, actual 
decision-making would take place behind closed 
doors, and many offices would effectively exist in order 
to distribute jobs, cash, and power—a process described 
as isomorphic mimicry (Larson et al., 2013). 
Budgeting for the security services was a primary 
example of this process: The 2011 budget allocation 
for the SPLA, police, wildlife and prisons service 
amounted to an already staggering 40 per cent of total 
expenditure (De Waal, 2014). However, actual spending 
on the security sector turned out to be closer to 60 per 
cent. Despite the enormous discrepancy, the Minister 
of Finance was never questioned in parliament why 
procedures and restrictions on budget overspending, 
drafted in close collaboration with donors, had been 
so egregiously violated. 
The budget was never used as a benchmark, as 
money was spent on the basis of what was available, 
not what was budgeted for. This in turn was primarily 
a function of oil production and international prices 
for crude oil. Intentionally or not, the budget process 
became a charade, designed to provide a front office 
for willing donors.
Some diplomats looking for systems and struc-
tures they recognized and understood were fooled by 
this elaborate ploy but others who did recognize the 
 
11 \  The Gurtong website lists the wide range of completely new  laws of 
South Sudan adopted either in the interim period (2005-2011) or after 
independence in 2011 (Luak, 2016). Most are neither widely distributed 
nor read and have little meaning outside of Juba, such as the Personal 
Income Tax Act, or the Public Premises Eviction Act.
South Sudan’s Armed Forces after  
independence (2011)
After a large majority voted in favour of Southern 
independence in the 2011 referendum, the Republic of 
South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 
2011. Following independence, many diplomats,  
particularly from Western countries, noted how the 
government’s stance towards them had changed. 
During the CPA-period, the government needed the 
international community to exert pressure on  
Khartoum not to block the referendum as well as 
technical and financial support to its newly created 
institutions. South Sudan, its rulers said, was a ‘baby 
nation’ that needed help until it was able to walk on 
its own two feet. After 2011, and particularly after 
South Sudan’s 2012 attack on Sudanese forces around 
Heglig (an area most diplomats acknowledged to be 
part of Sudan), this honeymoon was over. The donors 
were swift to issue condemnations for the alleged  
invasion of Sudanese territory, leaving the South  
Sudanese puzzled as to why the West would back the 
same regime they had up to now only vilified. By that 
time, the government had gradually become less and 
less interested in the critique of its human rights  
record and addressing the burgeoning corruption, 
which donors expressed concerns about, but they 
were never willing to genuinely push back. It was the 
beginning of a rift nonetheless. 
For a long time, these political differences did not 
translate into diminished financial and technical 
support. In fact, international involvement in the 
state-building project would only grow after 2011.  
Billions of funds were channelled through donor 
trust funds that were supposed to build the capacity 
of a wide array of new institutions: Line ministries, 
independent authorities, the newly established po-
lice, wildlife and prisons services, inexperienced or 
non-existing local government at four different lev-
els, the bicameral parliament and the Bank of South  
Sudan. 10 International technical advisors would draft 
10 \  The USAID website allows tracking of the amounts spent by the US 
government (by far South Sudan‘s largest donor) in assistance to South 
Sudan. For example, in 2006 this was US $213,778.00. In 2013 it was US 
$627,074,958.00. Apart from humanitarian aid (left out in the 2006 figu-
res as Sudan was still one country), this was mostly spent on gover-
nance (USAID n.d.).
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However, larger, more powerful commanders who 
threatened core government interests would be  
accommodated. The logic was that instead of using 
the SPLA to counter a threat on the battlefield, it was 
the act of incorporating the rebel commanders and 
their men that would serve to neutralize the threat. 
Matip was integrated because in the wake of the CPA 
the newly established government of Southern Sudan 
was struggling to establish its legitimacy and, for the 
first time, would lose revenue as a result of the actions 
of Matip’s forces around Unity State’s Thar Jath oil 
fields. The next round of amnesty, to which Peter Gadet 
and David Yau Yau responded, came in the run-up to 
the referendum, followed by another one during  
President Kiir’s independence speech almost one year 
later. The latest example was again the integration of 
David Yau Yau in 2014 and the establishment of the 
Greater Pibor Administrative Area to accommodate 
him. In 2013, Yau Yau had been almost the last  
remaining rebel, and the government seemed in no 
hurry to sign a deal with him, instead sending out 
SPLA units to push his forces out of the Pibor area. 
However, the outbreak of civil war forced its hand as 
the government could not fight two major rebel 
groups in Jonglei State at the same time. 
Other, less overly political outbreaks of fighting 
that would regularly occur were hardly seen as a cen-
tral government concern, particularly inter-ethnic 
cattle raiding. 12 Senior government of Southern Sudan 
politicians and SPLA commanders would facilitate 
this form of violence by distributing arms and 
ammunition to their constituencies in return for cattle 
and status. Some would use their control over SPLA 
units as a tool to loot and retaliate against other 
communities.
12 \  Interethnic cattle raiding, however, was at least as frequent and could 
lead to a greater number of casualties than violent acts that had a 
more over political motivation. Over the Christmas and New Year period 
of 2012, an estimated 8,000 Lou Nuer marched on the town of Pibor in 
Jonglei, threatening to “wipe out [sic] the entire Murle tribe from the 
face of the earth” (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Moreover, although cattle 
raiding has existed for a long time in South Sudan, prior to the out-
break of the conflict in December 2013 it had already taken on increas-
ingly violent ethnic overtones, with women and children the targets of 
abductions, rape and killing.
problems, believed it was a necessary step on the ladder 
of institutionalism: That as the rule-making process 
intensified it would increasingly exercise pressure on 
the government to put limits on the excessive cor-
ruption, nepotism and limited accountability. There 
was very little hard evidence to back up this theory. 
The SPLA was the quintessential example of out-
ward appearance without substance. The different  
integrated militias were now formally part of the 
same national army that was supposed to protect the 
nation and its people. In slogans, billboards, and gov-
ernment propaganda, the SPLA was portrayed as the 
country’s unifying defender, ready to withstand attacks 
from the North that would pose a threat to the South’s 
newly won autonomy. The newly born nation did  
indeed desperately need some form of unity, and the 
SPLA was probably the closest thing to a national in-
stitution—one potential explanation why the SPLA- 
IO sticks so stubbornly to its current name. Under-
mining the SPLA’s prestige by acknowledging parts of 
its past or exposing its flaws (including massive  
corruption) became tantamount to undermining 
Southern unity and thus the entire independence 
project. Paulino Matip, upon his death in 2012, was 
hailed by the government as a man known as a 
‘champion of peace and reconciliation’, glossing over 
the fact he was well known for the deliberate targeting 
and killing of civilians around the oil fields in Unity 
State when he was on the payroll of the government 
in Khartoum (BBC, 2012).
The Big Tent policy created the impression that 
whether or not one was punished or rewarded for  
opposing the government in Juba depended on two 
factors: Political ambitions and military effectiveness. 
As long as a militia’s activities were of a small scale 
and had little broader political implications, the SPLA 
would attempt to fight it—with the intensity of its  
actions fluctuating. Smaller militias spent long periods 
of time fighting the government with differing degrees 
of success, mostly involving control over or the ability 
to move around rural areas of little strategic impor-
tance. Large-scale fighting would only rarely occur. 
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To counter local level violence, international  
organizations and NGOs promoted local peace confer-
ences and conflict-sensitive development programmes. 
Whereas some donors understood the need to involve 
local armed actors, particularly in the CPA period,  
after 2011, most would exclusively approach such 
projects from a developmental point of view, not 
wanting to involve the SPLA or other armed groups.
Instead, local security was deemed the preroga-
tive of the police. Despite the fact that the newly  
established police (as well as the wildlife and prisons 
services created at the same time) were, especially in 
their early days, used entirely as means to formally 
reduce the size of the SPLA while retaining a reserve 
that could be called upon in times of crisis. The South 
Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) were primarily 
stationed in urban areas and their reach beyond 
country headquarters (one administrative level below 
the State) ranged from limited to essentially non- 
existent (van de Vondervoort, 2014).
The SSNPS neither had the means nor the political 
backing to deal with most cases of high-intensity  
interethnic conflict. Instead, the conflicts would be 
allowed to fester until the SPLA was sent in to force-
fully disarm perpetrators, which frequently resulted 
in widespread human rights abuses and the loss of 
life at a large scale. The commonly held view in South 
Sudan that the SPLA sided with certain ethnic com-
munities at the expense of others during those  
conflicts created further grievances and contributed 
to the outbreak of civil war in December 2013.
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States in particular had a strong presence at Bilpham, 
the SPLA headquarters near Juba. A team of contrac-
tors paid for by the US State Department was helping 
the SPLA to internally restructure i.e. its operations, 
administration, logistics, engineering and setting up 
military training schools. In general, the US assistance 
programmes were multi-year, multi-million dollar 
endeavours that in financial volumes eclipsed all  
other SSR programmes—notwithstanding the fact 
that there was no direct provision of military equip-
ment (Sudan Tribune, 2013). Sometimes, the two com-
ponents (accountability and enhancing effectiveness) 
were integrated in the same programme. This, for  
example, was the case with the ASI project, which in-
cluded mentoring and advice on strengthening  
operational capacity, as well as providing training to 
civil society and parliament on how they could hold 
the security services to account. 
Increasing oversight and accountability 
SSR as a concept makes a clear distinction between 
the civilian and the military realm, with the latter  
being accountable to the former in the form of the 
Ministry of Defence, the president, and ultimately, 
parliament. In South Sudan, this distinction has never 
existed. As outlined above, civilians frequently partic-
ipate in military-style campaigns. Conversely, even 
regular soldiers (of either side) generally live with 
their families and are only on duty part-time. 
At the political level, most elites with any influ-
ence on security policy have a background in the  
SPLA-(IO), and most will proudly continue to call 
themselves ‘General’, despite no longer serving in the 
army. The SPLM has not been so much a political  
party with a military wing, as the SPLA has been a 
military force with a political party, making civilian 
control over the military a paper exercise. 13 Outside 
oversight of the security sector has been equally spu-
rious. Civil society is, generally speaking, weak and 
13 \  The strongest example of this reality in South Sudan was arguably 
(inadvertently) given by Salva Kiir himself. When after the outbreak of 
fighting in Juba in 2013 he made his first address to the people, his 
main pitch was that Riak Machar had attempted to take control of the 
country by use of force, overthrowing a democratically elected govern-
ment. For the occasion, he chose to wear a military attire.
Security sector reform (SSR) and DDR: 
Lessons learned
Security sector reform in South Sudan: 
An uphill battle
International support
The fact that the SPLA was not sufficiently inter-
nally streamlined and reconciled made security sector 
reform (SSR; sometimes called security sector trans-
formation) an incredibly difficult undertaking from 
the start. The term itself misrepresents the actual  
situation as the country was actually tasked with  
security sector construction, not reform.
Structural international support for the security 
services mostly targeted the SPLA and SSNPS (wildlife 
and prisons services and the fire brigade were of sec-
ondary importance). Interventions followed the two 
traditional approaches to SSR: Increasing the ac-
countability of, and democratic control over the 
armed forces and increasing its operational efficacy. 
The first component (mostly supported by European 
countries) would include developing a national secu-
rity policy and legislation covering the armed forces; 
training on human rights, strengthening the over-
sight role of parliament and civil society, building the 
capacity of the military justice system and increasing 
transparency over military expenditure. Major players 
in this field were the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS through UNPOL and its SSR 
section), UK consultancy firm Adam Smith Interna-
tional (ASI; funded by the UK Department for Inter-
national Development), Switzerland (which had an 
SSR team based at the SPLA) and Norway. Implementing 
partners conducted trainings, had mentoring pro-
grammes and provided equipment to strengthen 
transparency and accountability within and over the 
different security services. 
The other component of internationally supported 
SSR, roughly speaking falls under ‘train and equip’ or 
‘enhance and enable’ programmes. Such programmes 
were aimed at strengthening the operational capabil-
ity of the SPLA to fight a foreign enemy, mostly the 
kind of military-to-military confrontations between 
South Sudan and the Republic of the Sudan that SPLA 
operational doctrine was designed for. The United 
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centralized patronage systems. The fact that the gov-
ernment had direct control over more than 90 per 
cent of its revenue through the oil pumped up in the 
Greater Upper Nile region meant that being part of 
the government implied a chance to partake in this 
system. The oil wealth flowed directly into the gov-
ernment coffers and was distributed largely through 
the military, which absorbed most of it in salaries or 
arms procurement. With little alternative options to 
access wealth (cows are generally not sold for cultural 
reasons) or jobs, the government and the SPLA became 
the two central nodes in a gigantic patronage network, 
effectively choking off all alternative options for busi-
nesses or industry to thrive. 
Individual commanders in particular had a  
personal interest in keeping administrative control at 
the unit level. The Ministry of Defence does not have 
an accurate system to register the number of soldiers 
and officers. Commanders have an incentive to keep 
it that way as artificially inflating numbers allowed 
them to pocket the salaries of so-called ghost soldiers. 
They therefore would block donor reforms that aimed 
to increase operational effectiveness and financial 
transparency by introducing a salary payment system 
linked to biometric data. 14
The insecurity about force size has persisted up to 
today. Only recently did South Sudan’s Presidential 
Advisor on Military Affairs, Daniel Awet Akot, reveal 
to the South Sudanese media that there was no reliable 
data available outlining the exact numbers of soldiers 
in the country and that the number of ghost names 
on the SPLA payroll may be even higher than that of 
the actual soldiers (Eye Radio, May 2016). 
The history of fighting, rebellion and integration 
in effect led to a divided, ineffective army that was an 
enormous burden on the national budget. However, 
the system was organised in such a way that no indi-
vidual would be able to change it without upsetting 
14 \  Uncertainty about the real strength of the army  has been an impor-
tant factor in the recruitment drive that occurred in the wake of the 
outbreak of hostilities late 2013. After it was hit by a wave of defections 
the army had little knowledge of the effective forces it still controlled. 
The safest bet was to start a large-scale recruitment drive in govern-
ment-friendly territories and to buy as many guns, helicopters and 
armoured vehicles as possible.
divided, with some of the most vocal opposition forces 
simply not heard as they were never members of the 
SPLA-(IO) and thus have ‘no right’ to speak up against 
those who ‘liberated the country’ in the view of the 
country’s political elite. 
Against this background, donors were in a bind 
when having to prioritize either operational effec-
tiveness or strengthen accountability. Reform of the 
security services on the scale envisaged for South  
Sudan would have to go hand in hand with reduced 
operational capacity as soldiers and commanders 
would have to get used to new procedures, rules, and 
command chains. Troops would have needed to be 
withdrawn from the frontlines for retraining, other 
units relocated across the country at significant  
expense. This at a time, when the threat from the  
government in Khartoum was perceived to be very 
real. Many individual commanders, especially former 
militia leaders, would often be reluctant to engage 
enemies outside of their areas of origin as they had 
little to gain from such operations, except when acting 
as a proxy forces on behalf of tribal interests. 
In recent years, the National Security Service and 
SPLA Military Intelligence in particular have begun 
to intimidate, harass, jail, assault and likely kill critics 
of the security services and the government in general 
(OHCHR; 2016). Reflecting on recent events therefore 
begs the question whether an operationally effective 
SPLA without commensurate progress in increasing 
accountability and transparency would have been a 
desirable outcome. The security forces have been used 
increasingly as tools to exercise control and defend 
core elite interests against the general wellbeing of 
the population. These interests included power, access 
to resources (land, cattle) for privileged communities, 
prestige or (faced with threats from Sudan, powerful 
militias, or crime inside Juba) the ability to appear as 
a functioning state.
The patronage network
Continued access to government coffers is anoth-
er key elite interest the SPLA needs to defend. The 
GoSS and the SPLA in particular, function as highly 
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launched in 2009. This delay was due to the prevailing 
instability and external threats from Sudan, difficulties 
in deploying an effective UN presence and establishing 
national DDR institutions and, crucially, a lack of  
internal consensus on what DDR in South Sudan 
should look like. The biggest challenge was that South 
Sudanese politicians assessed the economic situation 
of the country and saw hardly any attractive economic 
reintegration opportunities for the members of SPLA 
outside of the armed forces. The government at the 
same time did not improve the economic situation, 
which it could have done by investing the riches at 
its disposal in facilitating job creation outside of the 
public sector. 
Due to this lag in implementing a full DDR pro-
gramme, the window of opportunity provided for by 
the CPA was closed by the time DDR/SSR efforts finally 
took off in mid-2009. Whereas the soldiers of the SPLA 
received no significant salaries and were frequently 
under-supplied during the time of the ‘struggle’, after 
2005 they started to receive comfortable salaries to 
provide for themselves and their families. DDR prac-
titioners—despite significant financial commitment 
by the international community—had difficulties in 
developing a programme that would offer sufficient 
incentives for people to leave the army. Voluntary 
DDR was, for very evident reasons, simply out of the 
picture. 
In the end, the CPA-DDR programme that had 
aimed at demobilizing 90,000 combatants in the 
South (and another 90,000 combatants in other parts 
of Sudan), only demobilized 12,525 individuals, a frac-
tion of the intended caseload, and made no significant 
contribution to ‘right-sizing’ (i.e. downsizing) the 
armed forces. As mentioned earlier, the army continued 
to grow, and so did the total expenditure on the secu-
rity forces.
Criticism also emerged regarding the eligibility 
and verification process that these individuals were 
subjected to. At times the master list (detailing those 
formally enrolled in the programme) would not cor-
respond with information obtained on the ground or 
wrong names would be used on IDs. The means to 
rectify these shortcomings were limited as reliable 
 the balance. Bringing genuine command and control, 
as well as accountability to the armed forces risked 
upsetting the shaky bargain between Southern elites 
on which the SPLA’s internal stability was based. As 
one international UN staff member observed when 
talking about DDR: “Those Kiir is willing to get out of 
the army are the ones he does not control, and those 
he controls he is not willing to get out of the army”. 15 
And as long as the oil kept flowing at least everyone 
was benefitting.
But in 2013, political rifts within the SPLM started 
to become public, and a coalition of powerful members 
of the SPLM Political Bureau, led by Machar and by 
John Garang’s former wife, Rebecca, spoke out 
against the President, who in turn called upon his 
own military strongman, the then Governor of 
Northern Bahr El Ghazal and current Chief of Staff, 
Paul Malong, to recruit Dinka youth from Bahr El 
Ghazal to serve as a paramilitary force. This force, the 
Mathiang Anyoor, including its equipment, training 
and supply existed completely outside of the former 
army structures and without permission from the 
then Chief of Staff, James Hoth Mai. The Mathiang 
Anyoor played a crucial part in the ethnic violence 
that swept the city in December 2013, once again 
proving that ethnicity and power politics remained 
dominant factors in the South Sudanese military- 
political landscape. 16
Disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration in South Sudan
Flaws and challenges of the CPA DDR Programme
As mentioned earlier, as a means to create an  
enabling environment for human security and  
favourable conditions for peacebuilding, the CPA fore-
saw a DDR programme to be led by national institutions 
(Turyamureeba, 2014, p. 1). Although the DDR process 
was set to start by mid-2005, shortly after the signing 
of the CPA, the full-scale DDR programme was only  
15 \  Author conversation with former UNMISS DDR staff (March 2016).
16 \  The outbreak of the violence in Juba has been investigated extensive-
ly in particular by the AU CoI, as well as the UNMISS Human Rights 
Division (2014). The existence of the Mathiang Anyoor was first public-
ly reported in a Radio Tamazuj investigative article (9 March 2014). 
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options: agriculture and livestock, small business  
development, vocational training and accelerated 
learning.
Disarmament as such was no integral component 
of the CPA-DDR programme. At the point of pre- 
registration, programme participants (those who had 
indeed owned a weapon, this excludes WAAF) had  
already been disarmed by the SPLA. This implied that 
the international community not only had very little 
understanding of how the actual disarmament was 
done but also was not aware of what happened to the 
weapons that had been collected from individuals 
taking part in the programme. There was no interna-
tional oversight of the disarmament process (STHLM 
Policy Group, 2010).  
Overall, the programme’s impact on the lives of 
the DDR participants remained very limited. While 
the programme was in line with UN DDR principles 
at the time, it was hardly adequate for the South  
Sudanese context—for starters, the beneficiaries were 
already in their communities when the programme 
began, so they had little need for the non-cash elements 
of the reinsertion package. As a result, makeshift 
markets appeared outside of the gates of the UN  
demobilization sites, where beneficiaries sold the 
items received just hours earlier, often at a considerable 
discount to what the UN had previously paid. The 
same was true for reintegration assistance, which 
was often delivered with a significant delay (six to 
eight months after demobilization)—the educational 
programmes were too short and too superficial  
(usually not exceeding a few hours of learning per 
day over a maximum of six weeks) to enable most 
beneficiaries to significantly improve their socio- 
economic situation.17  This was mostly due to the pro-
gramme’s insufficient linkages to the different local 
economic and social realities, lack of entrepreneurial 
skills, limited employment opportunities in the 
17 \  It should be noted however, that most beneficiaries stated that they 
were satisfied or even very satisfied with the quality of the training 
received, according to client satisfaction surveys conducted by UNDP 
and its implementing partners. Having said that, these surveys do not 
independently measure the impact of the programming in terms of 
improving the socio-economic situation of the beneficiaries, nor did 
they allow the stakeholders to measure the cost efficiency of the  
programme.
points of reference (such as military ID cards) were 
absent. Given these shortcomings it seems likely that 
a fair number of ineligible people were able to get 
their name on the demobilization lists produced in 
the CPA period. 
Despite calls from the international community 
for greater accountability, the SPLA did not make any 
serious attempts to improve candidate selection and 
screening. The unwillingness to tackle this problem 
was only a symptom of the deep-rooted rejection of 
the CPA-DDR programme, which was perceived by 
the SPLA more as a risk to security than a factor con-
tributing to stability. This was likely due to the fact 
that, as former rebels were integrated who often had 
no background in the SPLA and limited training, the 
sitting SPLA leadership did not want to further dilute 
the share of the total force they actually controlled 
(and trusted) by selecting them for DDR. 
Due to SPLA’s limited will and intention to down-
size its active-duty forces, many efforts to implement 
DDR were only pursued half-heartedly. Instead, the 
commanders used DDR as an expensive social benefits 
programme for a limited group of people (HSBA, 2011a). 
Mostly special needs groups were targeted, such as 
underage soldiers, the disabled and the elderly as well 
as women associated with armed forces (WAAF), and 
these were usually not on military payroll. 
Largely resulting from the military’s lack of sup-
port for the process but also due to the foundation 
that was laid by the CPA, DDR as a concept was not 
connected to the overall security sector transformation 
process. The programme’s objectives were mostly lim-
ited to social and economic reintegration, and it had 
little impact on stabilization and security in the 
country. At demobilization, ex-combatants would  
receive a reinsertion package consisting of food for 
three months, cash (800 Sudanese Pounds) and non-
food items (such as blankets, buckets, etc.) from UNMIS. 
In the following reintegration phase, DDR participants 
were then offered a civilian training programme for 
life skills and a literacy and numeracy training. They 
could moreover choose from the following reintegration 
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confirmed that both procurement and hiring proce-
dures had been violated, while significant assets had 
disappeared. 
Combined with the very limited effectiveness of 
the programme, the discontent of the donor commu-
nity was responsible for ending demobilization in 
South Sudan in April 2011 (the programme continued 
in the rest of Sudan for several years thereafter). Since 
November 2010, the UN and the DDR commission had 
started planning for a new DDR programme, which 
would take into account the lessons learned during 
the CPA phase and would allow for real national own-
ership while implementation of the reintegration 
components of the CPA-DDR programme continued 
until late December 2012. 
DDR (pilot) programme
Talks between the SSDDRC and the SPLA about 
the design and objectives of the new DDR programme 
in the Republic of South Sudan started at the end of 
2010; from April 2011 onwards, the discussions also  
involved the United Nations partners, UNMISS and 
UNDP, as well as members of the donor community. 
BICC also provided technical advice in the context of 
a project commissioned by the German Federal Foreign 
Office. On 23 September 2011, as a result of these stra-
tegic talks, a national DDR policy document was de-
veloped and approved by the South Sudanese Council 
of Ministers. The DDR policy served as the foundation 
for the subsequent development of the DDR strategic 
plan (2012–2020) and the programme document, which 
would serve as guides for the planning and implemen-
tation of the new DDR programme. In order to boost 
national ownership of DDR, the new programme was 
guided and supervised by GoSS with the SSDDRC  
taking the lead.
The official aim of the new DDR programme was 
to assist in significantly downsizing South Sudan’s 
security forces, thereby reducing the fiscal burden on 
the government. During the period 2012 to 2020, the 
strategic plan foresaw to demobilize 150,000 people; 
80,000 SPLA soldiers as well as 70,000 members from 
other organized forces (wildlife, prisons services and  
 
 
country, insufficient start-up capital, inadequate agri-
cultural extension services as well as difficulties to 
access land that could be utilized for entrepreneurial 
activities (BICC, 2013).
The conceptual disconnect between DDR and the 
military was further accelerated by the fact that the 
CPA-DDR programme was steered by a civilian insti-
tution, the South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC, 
from 2013 onwards National DDR Commission, NDDRC). 
Created by presidential decree, the Commission, which 
has been led since 2009 by a former UN employee,  
Canadian–South Sudanese William Deng Deng, was 
designed to act as an interface between GoSS, the  
different UN agencies and the donor community. 
However, the Commission has only very limited access 
to the senior SPLA leadership, which is in charge of 
security policymaking.   
To make matters worse, the Commission’s relations 
with the international counterparts working on DDR 
matters in South Sudan were at times problematic. 
Even though the SSDDRC, on paper, had been created 
to design, implement and manage the DDR programme, 
in reality, the government had only limited control 
over implementation and resource management  
decisions. The SSDDRC felt that it did not really own 
the process and was often merely a bystander of what 
was supposed to be a GoSS programme. The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) adminis-
tered the donor funds, while other international part-
ners (like GIZ or IOM) as subcontractors actually im-
plemented it. Almost all international funds were 
channelled through UNDP structures, which meant 
that the SSDDRC had no real budget lines for executing 
the programme it supposedly owned (STHLM Policy 
Group, 2010). While donors committed very significant 
resources (according to some estimates in excess of 
130 million US dollars) to the CPA DDR programme 
(which included DDR activities in Sudan, in addition 
to the current territory of South Sudan) between 2009 
and 2011, financial management and international 
oversight were weak. An internal UNDP audit  
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(the de facto veteran’s administration), who had been 
pre-selected by the SPLA to go through the DDR pro-
gramme. The reasons for the smaller than anticipated 
caseload were twofold: 1), the SPLA, when asked to 
present a master list, failed to present sufficient suit-
able candidates, 2), some people who were sent to the 
transition site, when checked against the payroll data 
presented to the DDR commission in Juba, failed to 
meet the set eligibility criteria. This on the one hand 
shows that some of the screening mechanisms that 
were put in place in the aftermath of the CPA-DDR 
programme had started working. At the same time, 
however, this also exemplified the persisting lack of 
support from the SPLA, even at a time when GoSS was 
in name taking the lead in the implementation of the 
DDR programme. 
The establishment of a new higher-level political 
authority, the National DDR Council did not change 
much in this respect. The Council was put in place to 
oversee the DDR process, to ensure that the DDR pro-
gramme would get the necessary backing from the 
military and political elites, and to interlink DDR 
with programmes of other line ministries. However, 
the procedures involving the Council turned out to be 
lengthy. At times it would take the SSDDRC very long 
to get the Council to meet and take strategic decisions. 
In the end, therefore, one major problem identified in 
the CPA-DDR programme persisted even in the new 
DDR programme: The slow work of the DDR Council 
coupled with limited support, particularly of the 
SPLA, turned DDR more into a technical exercise 
than a political endeavour (supported by the military) 
to help build a fundamentally different security system 
in South Sudan. 
As for the disarmament part, the pilot faced simi-
lar challenges as the CPA-DDR programme. The fact 
that the pilot targeted war wounded heroes implied 
that the participants had in fact handed in their 
weapons long before entering the programme. In this 
sense, there was again no arms control element con-
nected to the DDR process. This was despite the fact 
that the DDR policy had made very explicit that 
the police).18  The idea was to first test the chosen im-
plementation approach by conducting a pilot target-
ing 4,500 people and setting up one transition facility 
in each of the Greater regions (Greater Bahr el Ghazal, 
Greater Equatoria, and Greater Upper Nile). This num-
ber was anticipated to increase incrementally in the 
subsequent years; the aim was to build ten transition 
facilities in all of the ten states of South Sudan. All of 
the target beneficiaries were supposed to be active- 
duty members of their forces and on payroll. With 
this objective, DDR planners responded to the major 
criticism phrased in the CPA period about the DDR 
programme’s ineffectiveness in contributing to the 
reduction of military expenditure. 
However, faced with enormous financial and 
logistical constraints in setting up the first transition 
facility in Western Bahr el Ghazal, the envisioned  
pilot of 4,500 ex-combatants was scaled down to a  
pilot of 500 people in one transition centre in Mapel 
(Western Bahr el Ghazal). Donors and implementing 
partners understood that in the planned fashion, the 
DDR programme would not be fundable and imple-
mentable in the given timeframe. The scaled down 
pilot was conducted with the overall aim to test rein-
tegration approaches and modalities and to develop 
actionable lessons that would inform and improve  
future DDR programming (Jinghua Zhou, 2014). The 
pilot programme was implemented by UNMISS  
(responsible for the Mapel facility as well as for some 
reinsertion activities) and the World Bank (responsi-
ble for the reintegration component) with funding 
coming from the DPKO mission budget and from the 
German Federal Foreign Office. In contrast to the CPA 
phase, GoSS continued to pay the salaries of the 
ex-combatants for a period of one year, which certainly 
helped with the transition from military service to 
civilian life.
In the end, the participants selected by GoSS to 
join the DDR pilot process only included 292 individ-
uals from SPLA’s war wounded heroes department 
18 \  At that time, official government estimates of the SPLA’s strength 
were as high as 220,000 soldiers, with at least another 120,000 mem-
bers of paramilitary and police forces. In retrospect, these numbers 
were certainly significantly inflated due to the presence of ‘ghost sol-
diers’ in those formations.
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which also included projects benefiting the larger 
communities (largely boreholes), to be implemented 
in line with broader national capacity development 
programmes. To the extent possible, the reintegration 
services (targeting individual ex-combatants and 
communities) had to be implemented through other 
line ministries utilizing national institutions and  
facilities, with the assistance of implementing part-
ners. Although collaboration between the SSDDRC 
and the line ministries were rocky in the beginning 
and remained difficult at a national level throughout, 
important but small breakthroughs were made in 
working with the line ministries at State level (for  
instance, agricultural extension workers from the 
State line ministries facilitated trainings for ex-com-
batants). However, despite this progress, overall the 
DDR pilot—in the same way as the CPA-DDR pro-
gramme—still appeared to exist in an isolated area of 
programming. This was not so much a mistake made 
by the SSDDRC, which in fact desperately tried to  
coordinate and connect its pilot activities with other 
line ministries and the SPLA, but it was more a matter 
of lack of investment of political capital in the process 
and absence of political will to assign DDR a 
cross-cutting role in stabilization and peacebuilding. 
What would have been needed in the first place 
to ensure that DDR could overcome this isolation and 
connect it to wider stabilization and reconstruction 
efforts was political and military buy-in. This, however, 
was never achieved, as DDR and SSR largely remained 
concepts demanded by internationals, to whom the 
SPLA and other opposition groups were not accountable. 
disarmament should be the first step in the imple-
mentation of DDR. According to the DDR policy, the 
SPLA and other security forces were anticipated to  
issue a plan for the collection or retrieval of weapons 
and ammunitions held by combatants selected for 
DDR. The destruction of unusable weapons and  
ammunition was—at least on paper—to be conducted 
under the supervision of the international community. 
Since the programme only targeted war wounded  
heroes and was suspended after the outbreak of civil 
war, it never managed to broaden its scope to include 
a disarmament component. That said, it is highly 
questionable whether the SPLA, with its history as a 
rebel movement in constant need for serviceable fire-
arms, would ever have agreed to the disposal or  
destruction of a functioning rifle.
While most participants reported in post-training 
surveys that they utilized the training skills they  
acquired through the DDR programme (especially 
those that had attended agriculture and carpentry 
classes), some ex-combatants were unable to implement 
what they had learned in the course. This is because 
some skills taught in the reinsertion centre (e.g. driver 
training, masonry, plumbing) were simply not relevant 
for starting businesses in the rural communities of 
return (Finn/Breitung, 2014). 
The decision to provide reinsertion trainings in a 
centralized facility like Mapel was mainly taken at 
the request of the SPLA, who deemed this approach 
most feasible. The Mapel experience has, however, 
well exemplified that this centralized, resource-intense 
approach, whereby people are kept in assembly/tran-
sition sites for longer periods, is simply unaffordable 
and not feasible from a logistical point of view, espe-
cially if these sites are in very remote areas that are 
difficult to access. 
This is not to say that the pilot did not consider 
decentralized community-based reintegration assis-
tance. To the contrary, in accordance with the strategic 
plan, the initial trainings in Mapel were followed by 
reintegration support in the areas of return. The DDR 
documents envisioned this reintegration assistance, 
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH SUDAN 
26 \ BICC \ WORKING PAPER  6 \ 2016
army, and the subsequent DDR/SSR process), has only 
met several times and is regarded by observers close 
to the process as not functional. Just days before the 
outbreak of the conflict in Juba, the SDSR board was 
still assessing the requirements of the National  
Defence Forces of South Sudan (stage I of the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review), a process that was ini-
tially supposed to last for four months only (author 
interviews conducted in Juba in June 2016).
Other institutions foreseen by ARCSS19 are equally 
crippled and lag behind the envisioned implementa-
tion scheme. The Joint Military Ceasefire Commission 
(JMCC) that is supposed to coordinate activities 
around cantonment, for example, is not functional 
either. The Area Joint Military Ceasefire Committees 
(AJMCC) designed to address cantonment issues on 
the state level have not yet been established. At the 
time of writing, the JMCC had failed to present  
detailed plans that are necessary to coordinate move-
ment of forces into cantonment and their upkeep at 
these sites. Meanwhile, fighting continues. The schiz-
ophrenia of the situation has been summed up neatly 
by the head of the JMEC, Festus Mogae who com-
plained that the JMCC had been unable to continue 
its work since the government general chairing the 
body was too busy planning military operations 
against the Opposition (JMEC, 2016).
Major questions around the cantonment exercise, 
particularly the number and location of the sites, but 
also the eligibility of certain IO forces to participate 
in the process, have also not yet been answered. Even 
if the necessary political will had been available, it 
seems doubtful whether the conflict parties (and 
their international partners) had the technical skills 
available to do their job properly. The JMCC, for  
instance, will clearly need significant technical sup 
 
19 \  It is noteworthy that the National DDR Commission that has played a 
key role in steering DDR activities in the past, is not listed in the peace 
deal amongst the commissions to be reconstituted (although it is 
mentioned at a later stage with regard to the demobilization of special 
needs groups). While the reasons as to why the NDDRC was omitted 
from the list of important commissions have not been stated publicly, 
it leaves the Commission in a state of uncertainty concerning its  
future role.
The recent peace deal and its potential for 
security sector transformation
When looking closely at how the August 2015 
peace deal is perceived by the South Sudanese govern-
ment and opposition, mistakes from the past are 
bound to be made again. The peace deal in its current 
form is, like the CPA a decade earlier, a power sharing 
agreement that has largely been imposed on the 
South Sudanese by the international community. The 
conflict parties show little trust in the process, culmi-
nating in the most recent eruption of violence in July 
2016. Prior to the new outbreak of fighting in the capi-
tal, observers noticed increased tensions between the 
conflict parties, with both sides threatening each 
other in direct encounters or via the media and fight-
ing continuing in different parts of the country.
In view of the recent outbreak of violence and 
Riek Machar fleeing the capital, it is highly question-
able whether the current deal and its underlying 
mechanisms of power and wealth-sharing can indeed 
bring the long awaited sustainable peace to South  
Sudan. Although for the moment, the South Sudanese 
and the international community still appear to hang 
on to the document, its utility is increasingly put into 
question not only because of the recent eruption of 
conflict but also because of the terribly slow imple-
mentation of the document’s provisions, particularly 
the security arrangements, in the past months. 
In an unstable situation like that of South Sudan, 
time is of essence. Unfortunately, after the signing of 
the peace deal, the international community took too 
long to exert meaningful pressure on the principals 
to implement it. The fact that Riek Machar returned 
to Juba in April 2016, a starting point for its imple-
mentation, was only a result of very lengthy diplomatic 
negotiations. While the CPA was hugely criticized for 
doing ‘too little too late’ in terms of security sector  
reform and DDR (Nichols, 2011), one can see a similar 
tendency with the present peace deal. For instance, 
the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 
Board that, according to Chapter II of the deal, should 
spearhead and provide the roadmap for the security 
sector transformation process (including details for 
unification of the army and security forces, future 
command, function, size and composition of the 
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will demand greater representation in the army; both 
because their youth requires jobs and to increase 
their own security. The only alternative to expansion 
that can help achieve proportional ethnic representa-
tion, which is downsizing, would then disproportion-
ately affect the Dinka groups who have over the last 
few years consistently been told they were needed to 
join and defend the country. Dismissing them in  
favour of mostly Nuer and Equatorians is almost  
certain to lead to renewed violence.
The past has shown that despite political leaders 
announcing in public their backing for downsizing 
and re-structuring South Sudan’s armed forces, in  
reality there has been limited political and military 
buy-in to this endeavour. The experience with the 
DDR Council demonstrates that the international  
actors and donors’ strategy to set up institutions as a 
means to contain what are essentially political prob-
lems can only work if all principal stakeholders enter 
the process, accept its strategic objectives and are 
willing to seriously engage in it.
port to coordinate the activities required to manage 
forces in cantonment (screening, biometric registra-
tion, identification of child soldiers, etc.). 
For the moment, cantonment is seen as an interim 
stabilization measure rather than a first step towards 
DDR. However, it will be very hard to dismiss individ-
uals or lead them into a DDR programme once they 
are inside the sites as they expect being integrated 
into the security services. Neither the peace deal nor 
the subsequent security workshop managed to provide 
sufficient clarity regarding some of these elements, 
despite the fact that they are key to initiating canton-
ment and demobilization. The documents, for in-
stance, neither mention eligibility criteria for canton-
ment20, nor do they indicate the projected caseloads 
required to be cantoned and demobilized. Exact infor-
mation about how many people are expected to be reg-
istered in the cantonment sites is also very hard to 
obtain. It seems likely that, as outlined before, even 
the main actors do not exactly know the exact size of 
their forces. Agreeing on these numbers will be a con-
tested process, and it can be assumed that both sides 
will inflate the numbers to maximize expected bene-
fits. This was already visible in late 2015, when youth 
recruited by the IO were moved up to the Sudanese 
border around Blue Nile State to prepare them for  
integration under the cantonment process. Another 
point that will require careful analysis in this respect 
is how to deal with the great number of militias (like, 
for instance, the white army) or other armed groups 
affiliated to both sides. The peace deal had not suffi-
ciently addressed this point either. 
The unresolved elements of the peace deal left 
room for the conflict parties to constantly re-negotiate 
cantonment issues and, at the same time, also played 
into the hands of hardliners on both sides who use 
the current state of suspense to further their own  
objectives. Over the course of the war, Kiir and his 
closest allies have integrated thousands of primarily 
Dinka youth into the security forces (UN Panel of  
Experts, 2016). Once the war is over, other communities 
20 \  These were allegedly discussed at a security workshop in Addis Ababa 
in 2015 but not included in the IGAD documents.
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maintain their personal patronage networks and 
power. Second, the SPLA was never reconciled because 
there has never been a nation-wide healing process 
by which these deep rifts could have been addressed 
in an adequate manner. 22 Combined with this, the 
question as to which role ethnicity plays and should 
play in the national armed forces has not been dis-
cussed in an open and transparent manner. 
The SPLA’s fragmentation, which has become 
even more pronounced through the recent conflict, 
implies that there is little respect for central com-
mand. The main constituency military leaders worry 
about are their own clan and tribe. Within the system 
of constraints they face, security sector reform is next 
to impossible. Although key leaders may have felt 
that downscaling and professionalization of their 
forces was indeed beneficial to the overall development 
of their country, there have been simply not enough 
personal and institutional incentives in place for 
meaningful reform. 
Even though DDR/SSR policymakers were aware 
of the existing challenges and the clientele networks, 
these were not sufficiently and openly addressed with 
the highest levels of government. By focusing on less 
sensitive areas of development and humanitarian 
activities instead of tackling South Sudan’s core prob-
lems with regard to its military, donors also played 
their part in this. 
DDR and SSR approaches instead wrongly pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the government 
would be willing to reform its military (which was 
not the case) and able to take charge of protecting its 
citizens and promoting (human) security, and even to 
22 \  As a matter of fact, the foundational myth of South Sudan in the inter- 
war period between 2005 and 2013 was that during the three decades of 
civil war preceding the CPA, the SPLA/M representing the united polit-
ical forces of the Southerners fought a heroic war of liberation against 
the Arab-dominated military under the command of the government 
in Khartoum. However, as described in this Working Paper, the reality of 
the civil war was a lot more complex, with much of the bloodshed due 
to violence between different South Sudanese militias, including the 
SPLA. As these conflicts have left deep scars in the collective memory of 
the people of South Sudan, ethnic conflict was bound to re-emerge af-
ter independence was gained in 2011. It is not clear whether a genuine 
process of truth and reconciliation would have prevented those devel-
opments, but it is fair to say that no serious attempt was made at the 
national level.
The overview of SPLA’s history has illustrated 
why reforming (or rather building) South Sudan’s  
security sector has been such a profoundly difficult 
task. The SPLA (and SPLA-IO) is a conglomerate of 
various ethnic factions with different goals and tra-
jectories; groups that at times have fought each other, 
and that have come together to fight a joint enemy 
only to split up again and again, forming various alle-
giances throughout South Sudan’s long journey  
towards self-determination. This history and the bur-
den that goes along with it have come to the surface 
again very clearly with the outbreak of the recent civil 
war. The Big Tent policy espoused by President Salva 
Kiir (and his predecessor John Garang) has bought 
the country unexpected and much needed peace dur-
ing the period between 2005 and 2013, but it came at a 
great cost in terms of military professionalism. The 
international community shares some of the respon-
sibility for this development, as the UN missed the 
small window of opportunity to start DDR and SSR 
efforts immediately after the signing of the CPA,  
encouraging South Sudanese policymakers to turn 
the integration of opposition militias into the SPLA. 
While at the time of independence, there was still 
hope that the deep cracks within the SPLA could be 
filled by a sense of nationalism and unity, this hope 
literally went up in flames in Juba in December 2013 
and again in July 2016.21  
The primary reasons for why the SPLA could be 
drawn so easily in what started as a purely political 
conflict are twofold: First, and this has been exten-
sively discussed in the chapter about SPLA’s history, 
there is a strong interconnectedness between the 
military and civilian realm. Influential political elites 
have a history in the SPLA and use it to form and 
21 \  It should also be noted that Salva Kiir’s policy of creating an ever larger 
patronage network to neutralize potential opponents, while creating 
some short-term gains in terms of political stability during the inter- 
war period, would not have been sustainable even if the split between 
him and Riek Machar had not escalated to civil war in December 2013. 
The patronage networks depended on the continuing flow of oil revenues 
(which were largely diverted to grease the wheels of the political ma-
chine) and the willingness of donors to pick up the tap for the necessary 
infrastructure investments in South Sudan. The end of the honeymoon 
period in donor relations after the failed Heglig adventure in April 2012 
combined with decreasing oil revenues made a continuation of this 
policy increasingly difficult, even before civil war erupted again.
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and the thousands of youth engaged in militias de-
serve a chance at an alternative livelihood and a 
move away from fighting. Government actors and the 
international community are legitimately preoccupied 
with these questions, and finding good answers is 
what is required irrespective of whether these fit in 
neatly with the current templates of SSR and DDR. 
There is a future for these concepts in South Sudan 
only insofar as they prove sufficiently flexible, adapt-
able, nimble, and politically humble with regard to 
the objectives they need to achieve and the people 
they need to serve.
.
fill the gap that will inevitably appear as a result of 
reform processes. Hence, mostly technical solutions 
were developed for what in essence is a political 
problem. 
In lieu of focusing the discourse on what is likely 
to happen or politically possible, DDR and SSR pro-
grammes worked on the basis of what should happen. 
Discussions between the government and its partners 
culminated in a range of policy documents (DDR  
policy, SPLA White Paper on Defence, Objective Force 
2017). These gave the impression that SSR/DDR in the 
ways these were foreseen would have a chance to be 
implemented and support wider stabilization. But 
setting up procedures, rules, and allocating responsi-
bilities (on paper) is one thing, actually getting indi-
viduals and whole institutions to accept change and 
alter behaviour, follow those procedures and come to 
terms with the concept that rules are not only intended 
to limit society or citizens, but also the military and 
what now counts as government representatives, is 
an entirely different challenge. 
Currently, there seems to be little appetite on the 
South Sudanese side to actually work to answer these 
questions. The past months have illustrated how hes-
itant both conflict parties are in implementing the 
security arrangements of the current peace deal.  
Political leaders in South Sudan still have little interest 
in changing the status quo and giving up the patronage 
networks through which they are able to maintain 
their power and status. But it is exactly these networks 
that need to be broken if security sector transforma-
tion in South Sudan is to be successful. 
But while DDR and SSR programmes may have 
proceeded on the basis of erroneous assumptions or 
flawed technical designs, this does not mean that the 
underlying questions the concepts try to deal with 
have become irrelevant. To the contrary, strengthening 
the military’s command and control to ensure that 
the policies decided at the Juba level are indeed im-
plemented in the States is important, as is truly civilian 
oversight and control over the actions of the military, 
and accountability in case this goes wrong. Similarly, 
the current military payroll is indeed unsustainable, 
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